A Global Combat Air Programme(GCAP) core vehicle concept on display at DSEI, London (Breaking Defense)
Much remains unclear about the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), including design, technical specifications, and cost. But perhaps the most intriguing aspect is Saudi Arabia’s desire to join the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan in developing the sixth-generation fighter.
Saudi officials first expressed their interest in GCAP back in 2023, citing defense industrial and economic reasons. They see an opportunity in localizing parts of GCAP, be it in manufacturing, technology, or human capital. The goal, they insist, is not a symbolic or junior partnership but an equal one whereby the kingdom has a stake and participation in the program that meets its defense and economic ambitions.
But let’s be blunt: While there are several reasons why the three GCAP nations should entertain adding Saudi Arabia to the program, there are fewer clear reasons why the Saudis would want to join up. And that requires a closer examination of what leadership in Riyadh may be thinking.
A good starting point is to consider how the UK, Italy, and Japan could benefit from including Saudi Arabia. GCAP’s development is guaranteed to have a significant price tag given its planned, next-generation capabilities which are supposed to surpass the fifth-generation, American-made F-35 and compete with the six-generation programs of the United States, China, and the FCAS effort from France, Germany and Spain.
So, reducing the costs through access to Saudi capital would be quite welcome, as it could accelerate the aircraft’s development, shorten export timelines (thus generate revenue earlier through sales), and ease the burden on the already constrained defense budgets of London, Rome and Tokyo.
Solidifying strategic ties with Saudi Arabia through GCAP is also not a terrible idea. This is a country whose geopolitical stock is on the rise, with its $925 billion sovereign wealth fund, ambitious economic and defense transformation plans, and $100 billion investment in artificial intelligence — the tool that’s slated to contribute $19.9 trillion to the global economy through 2030 and impact its future like no other.
It is my understanding that London is the one who’s pushing the hardest of the three for Saudi Arabia’s inclusion, which should be no surprise. UK-Saudi security relations are old and deep, dating back to the early twentieth century. British prime ministers and their closest aides have often suggested that the security of the island is tied to Gulf security of which, of course, Saudi Arabia is a huge part. The UK is the second most important security partner of Saudi Arabia, after the United States, providing it with equipment, training, advice, professional military education, and various defense services both in the UK and on Saudi soil.
UK military contracts to the kingdom have seen sales over the years of dozens of billions of pounds for various aircraft (Tornados and Typhoons), missiles, bombs, and maintenance and spare parts. Without continuous technical, engineering, and maintenance support from British personnel in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia would not have been able to pursue a range of military operations in Yemen in its recent war against the Houthis.
London has some work to do to persuade first the British public (very little discussion so far has taken place in the Parliament about Saudi Arabia’s potential inclusion in GCAP, and politics is definitely going to play a role here) and second its Italian and, especially, Japanese partners about the advantages of bringing Saudi Arabia on board.
Tokyo has voiced human rights concerns, but its resistance, in my view, is more of a negotiating tactic vis-à-vis its other partners to protect or increase its industrial equities in GCAP.
Certainly, it’s true that if Saudi Arabia makes major financial contributions to GCAP, it will expect industrial production in some capacity — last year, a Saudi official told Breaking Defense that “there’ll be no transaction without serious, decent and important localization in Saudi Arabia.” But that local production would likely be limited to smaller aspects of the program, not the kind of major engine and body work that Japan is currently eyeing in the program.
And the return for Japan could be mighty. In addition to Saudi dollars driving the overall program cost down, it would also provide geostrategic returns, creating stronger ties between Japan and a Gulf power while helping support the broader GCAP ambitions of a greater share of the sixth-generation aircraft market and less reliance on the US security umbrella.
London proposed a feasibility study in March 2023 about Saudi Arabia’s potential inclusion in GCAP, but it either hasn’t been completed or its recommendations have stayed confidential. In any case, absent consensus on this issue among the partners themselves and in British politics, a set timeline to decide whether or how Riyadh could join GCAP will remain elusive.
And yet, despite that uncertainty, Riyadh remains eager to secure the trio’s commitment, which means it is time to dissect what Saudi Arabia might get from its public flirtation with GCAP.
The economic case for Saudi Arabia joining GCAP is not compelling. Putting in billions of dollars to help with the development of the aircraft when you are likely to be constrained to only smaller parts of the production or localized MRO is a losing economic argument. Sure, Saudi Arabia’s engineers and technicians can benefit from the experience they would earn, be it in maintenance or other modest services, but even for the Saudis, dropping tens of billions of dollars for such little benefit is questionable.
Geopolitically, Saudi Arabia knows how essential military ties with the UK are and is constantly looking for ways to upgrade them. During the World Defense Show in Riyadh in February 2024, the two sides met and agreed to work together on advanced new capabilities in land-based systems, including air defense and armored vehicles, as well as unmanned aerial systems.
But those ties, as covered above, are longstanding, and it is unclear how much the Saudis would benefit more in London by joining GCAP. Similarly, how much Riyadh needs to increase its ties with Italy and Japan for its interests is unclear.
The tactical security case is not much more compelling. Saudi Arabia’s present and future defense requirements can be met through fifth-generation aircraft and more importantly, through better organized defense management practices tied to its own defense transformation plan.
Also, GCAP is not expected to be operational before 2035, and Saudi Arabia cannot wait this long to upgrade its capabilities, especially when the F-35 option already exists.
And that brings us to possibly the real reason why Saudi Arabia is so eager to publicly communicate its desire to join GCAP: to pressure the United States to sell it the F-35 and more broadly to secure an agreement on a mutual defense treaty, as has been discussed for the past couple of years.
If the public flirtation with GCAP is enough to tip American leaders to finally clear the F-35, as a way to maintain dominance in the Saudi defense realm both from a market share and a strategic standpoint, then Riyadh will likely be content to wave goodbye to its sixth-gen ambitions and happily take a more proven, currently in production jet — one which Israel has reportedly used against the Saudis’ traditional foe, Iran, over the last year.
The Trump administration is expected to prioritize arms sales as a foreign policy issue. Whether it calls the Saudi’s GCAP bluff or not could be a strong sign of how the next four years of relations in the Gulf will go.
Bilal Y. Saab is the Senior Managing Director of TRENDS US, an associate fellow with Chatham House, and an adjunct professor with Georgetown University.
