The next president must lead on missile defense

If you were to ask average Americans how much of the defense budget is allocated to defeating adversary missile attacks on the homeland, they would likely guess a significant amount. 10 percent? 5 percent? The reality: not even 1 percent.

Out of a proposed $850 billion dollar defense budget this year, about $6 billion, defined generously, is tagged for defending the homeland from Chinese, Russian or North Korean missiles. And the Biden Administration this year proposed a $500 million cut for the Missile Defense Agency’s total budget.

Why seek cuts to missile defense, even after US-made and co-developed systems have scored stunning successes defending the skies of Ukraine and Israel? President Joe Biden has historically been critical of US homeland ballistic missile defense on feasibility grounds, apparently unpersuaded by the last three tests, all successes, against threat representative targets. Some of his supporters are even wary of the regional and point defense systems that would be useful in defending the US homeland against low-flying cruise missiles — arguing falsely that such capabilities are “untested.”

Perhaps sensing an electoral advantage — who doesn’t want to be more defended? — President Donald Trump has made building an American version of Israel’s “Iron Dome” system a regular promise on the campaign trail. While the Iron Dome system is tailor-made for the kinds of threats Israel faces (rockets, drones, and cruise missiles), not the threats the US homeland faces (advanced cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles), an American version might be structured using the same principles. For instance, a “layered” defense employs different interceptors that are optimized for countering particular threats. To meet American requirements, one layer could counter long-range ballistic missiles, another layer could counter maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicles, and another layer could counter low-flying cruise missiles.

The timing for a revolution in support of homeland missile defense on a scale not seen since President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s could not be better. The combination of vastly improved technology, mounting adversary threats, and resurgent US political will indicates a growing role for homeland missile defense in US defense strategy.

Many Americans may not know it, but the United States has refused to develop ballistic homeland missile defenses against China and Russia, and built only very limited cruise missile defenses, for fear of causing an “arms race” or inducing preemptive strikes during a crisis. Beijing and Moscow have predictably exploited Washington’s restraint, built their own homeland missile defense systems, and tailored their military strategies around threatening coercive missile strikes on what they see as a vulnerable US homeland.

If adversaries believe that coercive strikes on the US homeland, at or below the nuclear threshold, can deter the American public or its leaders from defending their national interests, then that makes attacks more likely. Weakness invites aggression.

America must no longer deter its enemies with one arm tied behind its back. Relying almost exclusively on threats of punishment without the parallel threat of denying the adversary’s attack increases the risk of attack, escalation, and damage to the homeland if deterrence fails.

Critics occasionally acknowledge the deterrence benefits of improved and expanded homeland integrated air and missile defense but object on the basis that the systems must work perfectly, a “leak proof” defense, for it to be worth the investment. This is a strawman standard. Air and missile defenses are meant to raise the “price of entry” for an adversary’s attack such that he fears two things: failing to achieve the desired military and political effects, and prompting an unacceptable response. Should deterrence fail, air and missile defenses limit the damage and help preserve the capability to respond effectively.

Whichever candidate is elected president in November should recognize these strategic benefits and phase in budget increases towards homeland missile defense over their term with a goal of reaching around two percent of the annual US defense budget.

These increases over the short term should prioritize terrestrial, airborne, sea-based, and space-based sensors that can characterize the nature of the missile threat and inform decisions on picking the right interceptor. Then-Commander of US Northern Command, Gen. VanHerck stated that “uncrewed, semi-autonomous” air and maritime sensors can help provide advanced warning. Additionally, a renewed focus on “left of launch” options, i.e., before an adversary launches an attack, can improve deterrence by injecting doubt in the minds of the adversary military’s leaders that an attack will go as planned — or, should deterrence fail, that the damage will be worth the cost of the US response.

Over the long term, the United States should lean into its advantages over its adversaries: its competitive market economy and its allies. The US economy is tech-heavy and allies are already helping to co-develop advanced missile defenses — but there is more to be done, especially exploiting the space domain and advancing directed energy capabilities to greatly lower the cost per intercept, initially for counter-unmanned aerial systems and soon for cruise missile defense.

Building the capabilities to defend the US homeland from a series of coercive missile strikes will help deter conflict both at home and abroad as adversaries must consider not only their initial attacks failing, but also the US response — the worst of both worlds from their perspective. Only the sustained attention of the President of the United States will break the current logjam on US missile defense policy and determine whether adversaries can easily envision successful strikes in the heart of America.

Matthew R. Costlow is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy and a former Special Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.