Russian and Iranian flags on a desk. (Getty Images)
The sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024 has led many to focus on Russia, and its inability or unwillingness to prioritize Syria due to the conflict in Ukraine. But focusing too much on Russia understates the role that Iran, and more specifically Tehran’s proxies, played in propping up Assad. After all, Russia has been at war for almost three years, but it was only when Hezbollah was preoccupied with its war against Israel and Iran was no longer willing to spare resources to prop up the failing dictator that Assad’s regime finally crumbled.
Under the proposed “comprehensive strategic partnership” between Moscow and Tehran, we are likely to see the Iran-Russia relationship strengthen over time, not just on a conventional level but in terms of Moscow’s support for Iran’s proxy forces. A renegotiated defense treaty is likely to result in Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias playing a more outsized role in the Iran-Russia relationship.
With a renewed “all-encompassing” Iran-Russia defense agreement, Iran is likely to budget more funds for its overseas proxies and increase weapons shipments, creating new opportunities for Russia to tap sources of black-market weapons and skirt sanctions. Russia has started doing this already on a small scale; in March and April 2022, Iran-backed Hashd al-Sha’bi militants shipped Iranian rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank missiles, and Brazilian Astros II rocket launchers to Russia by sea, which were later used in Ukraine.
The reverse flow of weapons also exists. Less than a month after Hamas’s horrific Oct. 7, 2023, assault on Israel, CNN and The Wall Street Journal reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad agreed to send Hezbollah the SA-22 missile system — an advanced Russian anti-aircraft weapon — via Russia’s state-sponsored mercenary Wagner Group. While officials never confirmed whether Wagner completed the delivery, the IDF later released photo evidence of other “state-of-the-art” Russian missiles stored in Hezbollah weapons caches, smuggled over-land into Lebanon via Syria. According to an unnamed Israeli major cited by The Wall Street Journal, Russian weapons alone constituted an estimated 60 percent to 70 percent of the Hezbollah weapons confiscated by the IDF in the first few days of the 2024 Israeli ground operation in southern Lebanon, prompting major concerns about Russian-Iranian weapons proliferation to proxy militias.
As the benefits of a stronger military and diplomatic relationship between Iran and Russia trickle down to Tehran’s proxies across the Middle East, more frequent exchanges of technical military-industrial knowledge and personnel could equip all parties involved with an arsenal of lethal technical expertise, allowing them to use one another’s weapons more effectively on the battlefield.
As with the flow of arms, this type of communication is already taking place. On Feb. 12, 2024, Ukrainian intelligence reported that Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC were training Russian troops to operate Iranian Shahed-136s, Ababil-3 UAVs, and the Raad remote-controlled air defense system prior to their deployment to the Ukrainian front line. The Wall Street Journal reported that Russia provided Iran-backed Houthi rebels with targeting data earlier this year for their attacks on global shipping in the Red Sea, in addition to prior shipments of small arms. Just one month after its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Moscow began recruiting Syrian mercenaries for its own military, and later reports confirmed that Iranian proxies were training the new recruits alongside Russian soldiers at an IRGC base in Syria. As Russian troops continue to suffer heavy losses on the Ukrainian front lines, Moscow has recently turned to other Iranian proxies for fresh draftees; according to The Financial Times, Houthi militants are promised “high salaries” and Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in Ukraine. FT also reported that ordinary Yemeni men were tricked into travelling to Moscow and then forced to sign enlistment contracts.
This mutually beneficial exchange of technical know-how and personnel not only encourages continued aggression against the West but allows Russia, Iran, and Tehran’s web of proxies to develop independent production, maintenance, and operational capabilities.
Beyond the direct military cooperation already taking place, a “comprehensive” defense treaty could accelerate Russia and Iran’s abilities to manufacture each other’s weapons systems. Russia has already built a drone factory in Tatarstan’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone capable of churning out 6,000 Iranian-spec Shahed UAVs per year for its war in Ukraine. One tangible deliverable of a Russian-Iranian agreement could be a Tatarstan-style production plant on Iranian soil, with the capacity to transform the logistics and smuggling networks that funnel Russian weapons from Tehran to Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.
With the capacity to domestically produce more of the Russian weapons it sends to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Iraqi militias, Tehran could significantly reduce the risk involved and time required to carry out successful smuggling operations. A domestic Russian arms industry would also afford Iran with the resources needed to resupply its own air defenses and rearm its proxies as Tehran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis continue to engage in direct conflict with Israel.
Trading amongst themselves allows both Russia and Iran — two of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world — to self-sustain their own shadow economy, fueled by fleets of ghost ships and complex gold and oil smuggling schemes. Russia and Iran’s proposed agreement would see them cooperate on “all the spheres of bilateral cooperation,” including trade, indicating that a renewed treaty could result in a greater reliance on backchannel networks to raise funds and transport illicit goods — which already sees millions of dollars flowing through the network. Although the United States continues to take decisive action against the Iranian-Russian illicit trade networks, a defense treaty could inspire more creative sanctions evasion schemes and prompt an uptick in weapons and oil sales between Moscow, Tehran, and Iran’s proxy network.
The Russian-Iranian relationship has transformed over time from a marriage of convenience to a structured alliance between rogue states with shared economic and security interests. With this formalized agreement, Iran could secure both a steady supply of sophisticated weapons and also a P5 ally to safeguard its malign activities in the Middle East, potentially resulting in a more aggressive military strategy when carrying out direct attacks on Israel. This blanket protection afforded by Russian backing may in turn embolden Iranian proxies, prompting them to select riskier targets when attacking international shipping or American military assets.
Russia also benefits from closer defense ties with Iran; it gains millions of dollars in weapons sales, Iran-backed forces to replenish its battered military still fighting in Ukraine, expert training on Iranian weapons technology from Hezbollah and the IRGC, and logistical support from a regional ally after losing its military positions in Syria.
A renewed defense treaty between these two powers will render Iran’s web of proxies all the more dangerous by arming already destabilizing agents with more advanced weapons technology and the capacity to manufacture and ship arms to new battlefields.
Delaney Soliday is a research assistant with the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Prior to joining CNAS, she was a research assistant for the Jeanette and Eli Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. She holds a BA in Global Affairs from George Mason University.
Shivane Anand was the Joseph S. Nye Research Intern for the Middle East Security program at the Center for a New American Security from July to December 2024. He holds a BA from George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
