View of the Kremlin in the aftermath of a drone attack by Ukraine (Getty Images)
BELFAST — This year Russian President Vladimir Putin ramped up threats to his enemies across the NATO alliance by lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike — a move that directly followed Moscow accusing the US of approving Ukraine to fire Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) surface-to-surface artillery weapons inside Russia for the first time since the war began. Shortly after, Washington went on to publicly acknowledge the policy to loosen weapon restrictions was in place, after months of resisting calls to do so.
[This article is one of many in a series in which Breaking Defense reporters look back on the most significant (and entertaining) news stories of 2024 and look forward to what 2025 may hold.]
Russia’s new nuclear doctrine, signed by Putin in November, laid out in clear terms that any non nuclear power aligned with a nuclear state, or receiving support from a nuclear state — effectively all 32 members of NATO — will be considered targets if Russia thinks it is under threat.
William Alberque, former Director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Center, noted in an op-ed published on Breaking Defense, that “In all, the new doctrine says that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever the president decides to do so.”
He added, “But by expanding the role of nuclear weapons beyond … deterrence, and by expanding the dangers that could become threats — to include military infrastructure or exercises near its borders — it risks sending ambiguous or non-credible deterrent signals that could, in turn, require Putin to act out further in order to credibly deter the West.”
On the ground in Ukraine, another 12 months have passed, over 1,000 days in all since the war started, without either side able to strike a winning blow — though Russia continued with slow advances. Kyiv has shown renewed resilience and ingenuity, most notably making a surprise incursion in the border territory of Kursk that featured an estimated deployment of 10,000 troops.
At the time, the tactical gamble was looked upon by Matthew Savill, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, as Ukraine’s way of cracking “open” debate in NATO over whether to allow long range weapon strikes in Russia, but it was only when North Korean soldiers were deployed to Kursk that Washington finally dropped long range weapons restrictions to strike inside Russia.
It is estimated that Pyongyang has sent around 11,000 troops to Kursk. Losses on the North Korean side, shared for the first time in December by Ukraine’s main defense intelligence agency, are said to amount to at least 30 dead or wounded in action, reported ABC News.
Europe’s efforts to increase weapons production on Ukraine’s behalf and to restock equipment offered to Kyiv remains in the shadow of Russian industrial might. Morten Brandtzaeg, CEO of Norway’s Nammo, suggested that competing with Russian artillery shell production output on a “one-to-one” basis is futile, and that European industry would be better served by concentrating on quality over quantity. He did share reasons for optimism however, explaining that European production took a “huge step forward” over the last year, off the back of “separate nations” supporting “local industry” through government subsidies.
Brandtzaeg added that Norway, Sweden, Finland and Germany had all followed such a path.
As the year draws to a close, top of mind for European leaders is the potential threat posed by President-elect Donald Trump; not just from the fallout that could occur from the US ending military aid to Ukraine — a move he has threatened — but a peace plan that might take Ukraine membership of NATO off the table. The sudden collapse of French and German governments in quick succession has not helped to allay fears that European unity on defense issues will suffer to boot.
