Soldiers try to enter the National Assembly building in Seoul on Dec. 4, after South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law. (Photo by Jung Yeon-je / AFP) (Photo by JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images)
SYDNEY — Readers can expect the beginning of 2025 to be dominated by political turmoil in the Indo-Pacifc, with South Korea unexpectedly groping for an answer to the impeachment of its president, Australia possibly facing a closely divided parliament, Japan trying to build government that will last more than a year and China offering the prospect of more uncertainty in the highest reaches of its military.
Once South Korea selects a replacement for impeached president Yoon Suk Yeol, whose unexpected declaration of martial law sparked a fundamental threat to the country’s hard-won democracy, the outlines of the new foreign and national security policies will begin to emerge from the political fog. The most likely outcome, at this point, seems to be a more amendable approach to China, more skepticism of the tight intelligence ties with Japan and a less hardline approach to North Korea.
[This article is one of many in a series in which Breaking Defense reporters look back on the most significant (and entertaining) news stories of 2024 and look forward to what 2025 may hold.]
Japan, whose government led by Prime Minister Ishiba Chigger, suffered a sharp rebuke from the public in late October elections, may struggle to maintain the intelligence-sharing arrangement with South Korea. The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was originally signed for the two countries to share information on North Korea.
Under the original terms of the deal, Japan would send satellite imagery and electronic information to South Korean analysts, who would reciprocate with human intelligence going to Japan. The agreement is also designed to allow the two sides to share real-time targeting information to counter North Korean missiles.
The weakness of the Japanese government could also affect what have been rapidly tightening ties between Japan and Australia. For example, the two countries now speak each of other as partners second only to the United States, which is their primary ally. And the two countries defense ministers — flanked by outgoing US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin — announced in mid-November that Japanese marines would make regular rotations to Australia for training and exercises.
Further south, Australia may also face its own electoral turmoil with national elections likely to be held in March (they must be held by May). The Labor government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is widely expected to prevail, but there is a reasonable chance that the election may result in Labor losing much of its authority as the group of MPs known as Teals could swell their ranks and the coalition of Liberal and National Party MPs might surge.
That could be good for defense spending. The Labor Party, which has spoken bracingly of the grim regional strategic situation and the need for the three-nation AUKUS effort and for Australia to bolster its conventional major weapons systems, has actually let defense spending plans dip in real terms from 2023-2026. The election results will determine whether that changes. AUKUS, at least in theory, could benefit from increased support from the Liberal Party leadership.
Japan and South Korea’s efforts to tie themselves more closely to the so-called Pillar II or AUKUS — research and development of advanced capabilities such as hypersonic, cyber, autonomy, artificial intelligence and underwater tech — will depend on their and Australia’s political results, as well as the assessment of the incoming Trump administration.
On the other side of the geostrategic coin, in 2025 military planners, diplomats and strategists will be closely watching China as it continues to purge top military leaders, for reasons uncertain.
Finally, all of this will be taking place in the shadow of 2027 — the year by which the US says Chinese President Xi Jinping has said he wants the Peoples Liberation Army to have the capabilities to execute an armed takeover of Taiwan. Australia and Japan are keenly aware of the date. Japan has significantly boosted its defense spending to record levels and published a strategy that makes Taiwan the keystone of much of its planning.
While few experts believe Xi has set 2027 as the year he will actually try to take Taiwan, with only two years to go, military strategists usually plan for the worst.
