It’s time to put American bombers back on alert

At the recent US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Symposium, Congressman John Garamondi (D-CA) spoke on one of the panels, suggesting that the US should cancel development of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile—a position he has long advocated. Interestingly, he also challenged the military to return nuclear bombers to alert status if the nuclear threat is as serious as STRATCOM suggests.

While we may disagree with his views on Sentinel, we certainly agree with his views on returning nuclear capable bombers to alert status. It is long overdue.

Russia already fields a tactical nuclear arsenal ten times larger than the US. China is also set to become a nuclear peer of the US by 2035. And North Korea is building a nuclear arsenal that, according to dictator Kim Jung-Un will see “exponential” growth in the years ahead.

With China and Russia entering a “no limits” friendship and North Korea and Russia entering a military alliance, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg suggested in June that Russia may  soon provide North Korea, and possibly China, with technical assistance and fissile nuclear material—needed to make more nuclear warheads—in return for assistance against Ukraine.

President Joe Biden recognizes the growing threat. According to the New York Times, Biden signed out new strategic guidance in March that ordered the US to prepare for coordinated nuclear threats from China, Russia, and North Korea.

The long-term consequence of this tightening relationship is that an axis of autocracy will field a collective nuclear arsenal vastly superior to that of the United States. This is a recipe for coercion, with all three rivals potentially able to hold American policy at the end of a nuclear-tipped saber. Should the US military intervene, for example, in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it is certain Beijing will use escalatory nuclear threats to try and coerce the United States into sitting out the conflict—all while North Korea and Russia look for a way to take advantage of the situation.

To make matters worse, the United States, which fields up to 1,550 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons across its force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), nuclear bombers, and ballistic missile submarines, can only count on 400 ICBMs and a portion of the nation’s Ohio-class submarine force to be ready day-to-day.

Today, the nation’s nuclear bombers are not on what is called “alert status,” which means B-52 and B-2 bombers are loaded with their compliment of nuclear weapons and aircrews are standing by to quickly get the jets off the ground and to safety before a possible attack. In a crisis, the Air Force would require days, or longer, to return the bomber force to alert status, which the Air Force could only maintain for a short period before the force broke. This leaves the nation’s 46 nuclear-capable B-52s and 19 B-2 bombers sitting ducks for a conventional or nuclear strike.

Returning the nation’s nuclear-capable bombers to alert status, even if just for a portion of those bombers, is necessary for ensuring the survival of the bombers and signaling China and Russia that the United States takes nuclear deterrence seriously.

This problem is not a new one. In 2021, then-Commander of US Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he would ask for the bombers to return to alert status if the nation lost the ICBM force.

Lt. Gen. James Dawkins, then the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, explained soon after that the Air Force could not return even a few bombers to alert for more than a short period of time because, “You’re going to need more aviators, you’re going to need more Security Forces [personnel],  more maintainers…more bombers… infrastructure improvements at the [alert] facilities, and you’re going to need more tankers.”

The need and challenges are even greater today. The Air Force now has fewer nuclear-capable bombers than at any point in its history and lacks a crew force to train and sustain such a mission. This does not account for the needed security forces Airmen to guard the jets, maintainers to fix them, and tanker aircraft to provide mid-air refueling.

How can this problem be addressed? In the long term, the nation must purchase several hundred bombers. This requires the Air Force to focus on long range strike, arguably its most important mission. But realistically, production of such systems takes too long to address the near-term risk.

The short-term solution is to dramatically increase the number of trained bomber crews, adding needed security forces airmen, and training the required maintenance and support personnel. The same is true of the tanker fleet that supports bomber operations.

It will not be cheap. It will require prioritizing nuclear capabilities over other needs in the defense budget and, likely, non-defense spending. It will not be easy. Given recruitment challenges facing the Air Force and the timelines for training air crews, it will require a hard press today.

But those are issues that can be overcome if there is will — and there needs to be will, because a strong nuclear deterrent is literally existential to keeping America safe and prosperous.

When President George H. W. Bush took the bomber force off alert on September 27, 1991, the bomber force had stood alert for 12,414 straight days. Now, a week may be too much for a force one-tenth the size it was in 1991. Unfortunately, the bomber force is a hollowed-out shadow of its former self.

It doesn’t have to be this way. With the right focus and attention, we can make sure a key part of America’s strategic deterrent is up to snuff.

Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He spent more than two decades in uniform and as an Air Force and Army civil servant working on nuclear issues. He is also the host of the NucleCast podcast.

Lt Col Derek Williams is a U.S. Air Force B-52 Weapons System Officer and graduate of Sandia National Laboratories’ Weapons Intern program.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, the United States Space Force, or U.S. Strategic Command.