Israeli operations in Lebanon should draw on lessons from the past

After almost a year of anticipation, the Israel Defense Forces began ground operations in southern Lebanon on the evening of Sept. 30. Less than 24 hours after Israeli forces stepped foot over the border, Iran unleashed over 180 ballistic missiles at Israel itself. Less than 48 hours after the invasion, the IDF announced eight soldiers had been killed in fighting with Hezbollah forces.

Though it is early days still, the IDF is going to face challenges in this new operation. If history is any guide, a short, limited operation (as the IDF has described its plans) will leave the job undone, meaning Israel now faces the real prospect of becoming bogged down inside Lebanon’s boundaries if it can’t accomplish its mission quickly.

At the start of the operation, the IDF described the situation as “limited, localized, and targeted ground raids based on precise intelligence against Hezbollah terrorist targets and infrastructure in southern Lebanon.” The initial target of the IDF’s operations are villages near the border.

The decision to begin a ground offensive in Lebanon came after almost a year of rocket, missiles and drone attacks by Hezbollah. This included more than 7,500 rockets launched at Israel between October 2023 and August 2024. In the wake of the first attacks on Oct. 8 of last year, Israel evacuated communities along the northern border, including the city of Kiryat Shmona; more than 60,000 Israelis remain displaced, with no way to return home as long as the Hezbollah attacks continued.

In late August Israel’s Defense Minister urged the government to make returning the residents to the north a goal of the war. Prior to this point, the goals of the war were focused on Gaza and included returning hostages held in Gaza, and defeating Hamas’ military and governance capabilities. Once the government approved the new goal in the north in mid-September, the stage was set for a series of rapid moves against Hezbollah — including successful airstrikes against the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah — aimed at seizing the initiative and decimating Hezbollah’s command and control.

The IDF began its offensive into Lebanon with the 98th Division, which includes the IDF’s Paratroop Brigade and Commando Brigade. The 7th Armored Brigade is also operating alongside this unit. This is the same group of units that fought in Khan Younis in Gaza and was credited with innovating tactics against Hamas tunnels; it is expected that in Lebanon they will face Hezbollah tunnels and a complex battlefield that includes small villages and terrain that is a mix of hills and streams. (Notably, since the ground operation began, the IDF has stated that units have carried out 70 small targeted operations over the last 11 months, helping prepare the ground for the current war.) On Oct. 2 the IDF said its 36th Division, which includes the 188th Armored Brigade, Golani infantry and a brigade of reservists, was also operating in Lebanon.

So, what happens now that Israeli forces have crossed the border? History provides a lesson here.

Israel has fought in Lebanon three times. The first event, which saw Israel crossing the border in March of 1978, ended up being a truly short campaign against Palestinian militants. The week-long operation targeted areas south of the Litani river and resulted in two UN Resolutions demanding Israel withdrawn and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

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There may be more to learn from looking at the two other incidents, 1982 and 2006.

For instance, in 1982 the initial operation was envisioned as a near-border operation against Palestinian militants, but it rapidly expanded to a march on Beirut as more opposition was encountered. It quickly found itself fighting Hezbollah and other groups, meaning the original goal shifted to new fights against an emerging insurgency. The civilian population of  villages near the border, some of whom initially welcomed the IDF, also quickly became unhappy with the Israeli presence.

Although the stated objective of getting the militants to leave the border was accomplished, the IDF remained in Lebanon, slowly pulling back from Beirut to the south where it established a security zone working with local forces. In fact, Israel would remain holding some territory until 2000.

Just six years later, Hezbollah attacked across Israel’s border, killing eight Israelis and kidnapping two more. That kicked off a 34-day war, which the IDF initially tried to win using airstrikes, drawing on lessons from the recent successful air campaign waged by the US in Kosovo. When this didn’t end the Hezbollah rocket fire, the IDF sent in ill-prepared ground forces who suffered heavier than expected losses against Hezbollah — a surprisingly strong resistance that burnished the group’s reputation and, over time, helped Hezbollah become even more entrenched in Lebanon. Eventually, the two sides settled, leading to UN Resolution 1701.

Therefore, in 1982 and 2006 the initial advance into Lebanon led to unexpected results on the ground and mixed results regarding the stated objective. In both cases the end of the campaign left well-armed militant groups north of the border. Attempts to get groups such as Hezbollah to leave southern Lebanon have not succeeded, and UN Resolutions haven’t achieved their mandates.

In both 1982 and 2006 the goal was the same: Remove militants from the border region. And in both cases, the IDF had initial success but then ran into challenges that led to an extended conflict.

To achieve success in 2024 Israel will need to have measurable goals and a strategy to leave Lebanon when the mission is accomplished. The stated goal is to bring Israelis back to their homes in the north, which requires clearing out Hezbollah’s ability to launch rockets over the border with impunity. But the lessons from 1982 and 2006 show that even if Israel clears out the region, it will need to explain how it will fill the vacuum left by Hezbollah near the border. The Lebanese government lacks leadership at the moment — the president’s office is unoccupied because Lebanese factions cannot agree on a leader, and Lebanon’s Prime Minister has not proven an effective leader in recent years. Without a leader in Beirut to direct the Lebanese army, which has been funded and backed by the West, to take up positions in the south, and without a UN willing to enforce its resolutions, it’s unclear how Hezbollah will be removed permanently.

Now, the 2024 war in Lebanon does have two major differences with earlier conflicts. First, the IDF is better trained for this war. The 36th Division and various reserve units have spent nine months training, rotating brigades into exercises that simulate the war in the north. Units such as the 98th Division have spent a year fighting Hamas in Gaza and rooting around in tunnels to uproot what the IDF calls terrorist infrastructure. The IDF has also spent a year carrying out precision strikes on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and conducting clandestine raids with special forces, essentially softening up the area for the bigger ground incursion.

A second major difference is the Iranian backing of Hezbollah and its attempt to knit Hezbollah into a wider group of Iranian-backed groups has led to a multi-front war against Israel. This led to direct Iranian attacks on Israel, most notably this week’s salvo of ballistic missiles. In addition, Iranian backed groups in Iraq and Yemen have sought to strike at Israel to distract from the IDF’s focus on other fronts, whether Gaza or Lebanon. This multi-front war is completely different than what Israel faced in 1982 and 2006 and has the potential to lead to a larger regional war.

This leaves Israel with multi-layered challenges in Lebanon. The IDF wants to remove terrorist infrastructure that was built in villages near the border. It could achieve that narrow goal and withdraw. Hezbollah, which has lost many of its commanders and its leader to IDF strikes, may not be in a position to inflict losses on the IDF. In addition, the IDF has prepared for this war via years of training, and Israeli forces are equipped with the latest technology to help protect forces from threats such as anti-tank guided missiles. However, Iran’s threats and threats by Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere could lead to a wider war. If Hezbollah appears to be regrouping, the IDF could also be prodded to go further north to fight the group — dragging Jerusalem into more of a quagmire that could force it to stay in the country longer than it would like.