
Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers a speech during his visit at the Vostochny cosmodrome on April 12, 2022. (Photo by Yevgeny Biyatov/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)
WASHINGTON — Russia’s “inflated” fears of a potential US first strike in space, as well as Moscow’s increasing “risk tolerance” present challenges to US efforts to keep the peace in the heavens, a new Space Force-commissioned think tank study finds.
The study published today by RAND, “Emerging Factors for U.S.-Russia Crisis Stability in Space” authored by summer associate Cheyenne Tretter, further warns US policymakers and diplomats that Russia’s “relative restraint” regarding the space domain in the conflict in the Ukraine war should not be expected in any future conflict in the West.
RAND’s research work was commissioned by the Space Force’s Chief Strategy & Resourcing Officer Lt. Gen. Shawn Bratton, and was conducted within the RAND Project AIR FORCE Strategy and Doctrine Program as part of its fiscal year 2023 project, “Crisis Stability in Space.”
The key problem, the study finds, is that Moscow’s hyper-suspicious view of US military intentions in space are driving Russia’s military to a more aggressive and hair-trigger stance, but also raising barriers to bilateral communications aimed at ratcheting down conflict risks and/or finding ways to de-escalate once a crisis is underway.
“Russia’s fears about U.S. incentives for early escalation in the space domain and perceptions of U.S. hostility heighten the potential for misperceptions of U.S. actions in space. Russia’s emerging approach to escalation management—a cost-imposition strategy based on the belief that escalation can be controlled—might further reinforce perceived incentives to escalate early,” the study states.
Indeed, there is a school of thought among Russian analysts that is highly concerned about US threats to the space-based elements of Moscow’s nuclear deterrent and the possibility that Washington plans to use space to conduct a disarming attack to deprive Russia of its retaliatory capability, the study adds.
The author makes two key recommendations:
- “U.S. officials responsible for managing U.S.-Russia crises in space should be prepared for contingencies in which meaningful cooperation or communication with Russia is absent. Officials will likely need to navigate a decision space that is fraught with uncertainty and inflated Russian threat perceptions that will complicate U.S. attempts to manage escalation risks.”
- “U.S. officials should not assume that Russia’s space activities during the conflict in Ukraine are indicative of a broader trend of Russia’s risk aversion in space. … There are emerging threads that suggest that Russia’s risk tolerance in space might even be increasing because planning for warfighting in space has become more explicit. In a conflict between NATO and Russia, the United States should be prepared to face an adversary that not only possesses advanced space and counterspace capabilities but has also learned lessons during the invasion of Ukraine about how to target Western space assets most effectively.”