China’s newest military base is up and running, and US officials see more of them on the horizon

BANGKOK — With the months-long presence of Chinese warships at Cambodia’s Ream naval base and a major bilateral military exercise there in May, China’s newest overseas military facility appears to be up and running, confirming years of suspicions about China’s presence in the Southeast Asian country.

While the extent of China’s access to Ream remains unclear, it would be China’s second overseas military base, and few who have watched those bases emerge expect it to be the last. US defense and intelligence officials and other analysts are already tracking dozens of countries that could host them in the future.

US concerns about Ream have been building for years but became serious in 2019, when Cambodia unexpectedly declined US assistance with repairs there. Since then, US media reports have described a secret deal granting China’s People’s Liberation Army exclusive access to the base, and satellite images have shown rapid and extensive construction, including the demolition of a US-funded building in late 2020.

When Cambodia officially broke ground on Ream’s “modernization” in June 2022 — at a ceremony where a sign said it was funded by “grant aid from the People’s Republic of China” — officials said upgrades would include a dry dock, an extended pier, and dredging so ships up to 5,000 tons displacement could use the port. The extended pier, nearly 1,000 feet long, was built in the first half of 2023, and in December, two Chinese corvettes tied up alongside it. Those vessels used the pier for several months — and appeared to be the only ships using it, analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said in April — and were joined by three more Chinese navy ships in May, when the countries held the largest iteration yet of their annual Golden Dragon bilateral exercise.

The PLA “is already clearly getting some use out of the facility, even if construction is nowhere near complete,” said Thomas Shugart, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. A Cambodian defense official said on July 2 that the Chinese warships at Ream “have only recently arrived,” a sign Chinese vessels will have what Shugart called “at least a rotational presence there.”

When additional logistical facilities, such as fuel tanks and wharves, are built, Shugart said, “I imagine that presence will be become more robust, perhaps with permanently stationed forces.”

Cambodian officials have repeatedly denied that China will have a permanent base at Ream, citing constitutional prohibitions on foreign basing, and offered shifting explanations for China’s presence there. (A Chinese official said in 2022 that the PLA would have access to “a portion” of the base.) Phnom Penh has said the warships’ extended stay at Ream was to train Cambodian sailors and test the new pier, and officials from both countries have said China will not have exclusive access.

Based on what has been built, China’s outpost at Ream is “looking like a medium-size naval base with facilities to support training, maintenance, personnel support, supply,” and other functions, Shugart, a retired US Navy captain, said. “I’d expect those to facilitate missions like unit training, near- and far-seas patrols, and in wartime sea-control operations supporting the defense of China’s southern sea lines of communication (SLOCs).”

US officials have been vocal about their concerns over the intent, nature, and scope of the work at Ream and the PLA’s role there and have sought to counter deepening Sino-Cambodian ties, most visibly with high-level visits to Cambodia. For the US military, the concern is that the PLA could eventually use Ream to project and sustain operations across the southern end of the South China Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, and into the eastern Indian Ocean — including air power if a nearby airport is converted for military use — and to extend intelligence-gathering over those areas. China already has bases on islands in the South China Sea, but Ream is closer to the Strait of Malacca, a vital corridor for goods and ships between the Indian and Pacific oceans.

SLOC Options

The work at Ream reflects the expanding overseas footprint of Chinese security forces. They operate satellite tracking stations and intelligence-gathering facilities in several countries, including in the Western Hemisphere, and have a paramilitary outpost in Tajikistan. Chinese firms have invested heavily in port facilities around the world, raising concerns about Beijing’s access to “dual-use installations” designed for commercial activity but capable of supporting military operations.

But formal military bases — which Chinese officials often describe as logistical support facilities — provide greater access for more units to conduct more complex operations. Beijing announced plans to build its first overseas base in Djibouti in late 2015. It was officially opened in 2017 and has hosted forces conducting anti-piracy patrols and similar operations. While those two bases, both modest in size, are a far cry from the US’s globe-spanning base network, the speed with which Beijing has set them up has rattled Washington. US officials and outside experts have spent recent years monitoring China’s diplomatic and economic activity to see where its next bases might be.

Since 2020, the US Defense Department’s annual report on China’s military has named multiple countries where China is “likely considering” or “pursuing” military facilities. The most recent report, published in October, listed Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the UAE, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The US intelligence community’s most recent annual threat assessment, published in February, also said that in addition to Djibouti and Cambodia, “Beijing reportedly is considering pursuing military facilities in multiple locations, including — but not limited to — Burma, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, and the UAE.”

Experts have tried to narrow that list by analyzing China’s foreign investments and official statements. A RAND Corporation report released in late 2022 ranked 108 countries based on their desirability to China for military operations and the feasibility of China obtaining basing or access, with a focus on the 2030-2040 timeframe. Four countries scored in the top quartile across both dimensions: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Cambodia, which all have ports and other infrastructure that China is helping develop.

Of the 24 countries that scored in the top 50 percent in the RAND report, 10 were in the US Central Command area of responsibility and seven each in the US Africa Command and US Indo-Pacific Command areas. Middle Eastern countries generally scored higher given their proximity to important sea lanes, terrorism concerns, energy exports, and potential willingness to increase investment and security ties with China, the report said, adding that “relatively developed coastal countries” also ranked favorably across both dimensions.

A 2023 report by AidData, a research group at William & Mary university, examined ports and infrastructure financed by Chinese state-owned firms in low- and middle-income countries between 2000 and 2021, assessing the scale of the financing, the strategic value of the ports, and the country’s relationship with Beijing in order to assess where China was likely to set up bases for its maritime forces. Alongside Ream, the report listed seven locations “where China might establish naval bases in the next two to five years”: Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Bata, Equatorial Guinea; Gwadar, Pakistan; Kribi, Cameroon; Loganville, Vanuatu; Nacala, Mozambique; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.

The reports reflect what experts say is China’s focus on being able to secure access to the SLOCs connecting it to export markets and sources of energy imports. Many of those routes run through the Indian Ocean, where Chinese port projects have been concentrated over the past decade. The recent Pentagon report also said China “is most interested in military access along the SLOCs” to the Strait of Hormuz and Africa as well as to the Pacific Islands, where China has for years sought a military presence that could help it sustain operations beyond the limits of the first island chain.

US intelligence has highlighted places where China’s efforts are advancing. Media reports in late 2021 indicated that US officials had learned of Chinese plans to set up bases in Equatorial Guinea and the UAE. US officials cautioned both countries against hosting the PLA, but a classified US map leaked on Discord in spring 2023 said construction on a base in the UAE was continuing and that Equatorial Guinea and China had “likely approved [a] facility agreement.” The map also said negotiations had been “observed” between China and Gabon, Tanzania, and Mozambique.

‘A Work In Progress’

Determining where Chinese bases will appear is complicated by sparse information about Chinese thinking. Chinese sources rarely list specific countries of interest, and official statements and writings often show evolving views of what the PLA will need to do overseas and where. The list of potential hosts may also grow or shrink as domestic events shape those countries’ relations with China.

The leaked map referred to “Project 141” under which the PLA “seeks to establish at least 5 overseas bases and 10 logistic support sites by 2030 to fulfill Beijing’s national security objectives,” including protecting its economic interests. But even if Beijing reaches that goal, those bases may still be limited in what they can support.

According to a RAND report published in June, PLA researchers acknowledge deficiencies, such as inadequate command-and-control and lack of experience among troops, in their ability to use overseas bases. While the PLA is building an expeditionary force that would use of such bases, the report said, “its capability and capacity to sustain overseas operations are likely to be limited through at least 2030” and that PLA writings suggest it “has neither the intent nor capability” to use its overseas bases “to launch preemptive attacks or other offensive operations” against the US in a conflict “through at least 2030.”

China’s pursuit of formal bases may also be tempered by political considerations. Pushing host countries to allow them may tarnish Beijing’s narrative about its “peaceful rise” as a great power, and matters closer to home, such as unification with Taiwan — an imperative for the Chinese Communist Party — may limit the resources devoted to bases and operations farther afield. “Until Taiwan and other territorial disputes are resolved, it will be be difficult for the PLA to focus on developing the core competencies necessary for an expeditionary force,” Michael Dahm, a senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said in an interview in December.

China “can and probably will develop a limited expeditionary capability in the near future,” said Dahm, a retired US Navy intelligence officer who served as assistant naval attaché in Beijing, but the PLA “is a long way from being on par with the US military, able to use military power to shape events and set geostrategic conditions halfway around the world.”

China’s port investments have raised concerns about those facilities being used to support Chinese military operations and to monitor and potentially interfere with US operations. Chinese leaders do see those ports as a way to support the PLA’s logistical and lower-end maintenance needs, but the technical limitations of those facilities and the concerns of the host country likely rule out their use for higher-end operations or combat. The PLA may view “a mixture of military logistics models,” including co-location at commercial facilities as well as formal bases, as what “most closely aligns” with its logistics needs, the recent Pentagon report said.

Despite the uncertainty about what China’s bases will look like and where they will be, few in Washington doubt there will be more of them. “I would just characterize it as a work in progress,” a senior US defense official said in October when asked about China’s progress on foreign basing. “I think they’re continuing to try to expand the access in the locations that are available to the PLA globally, and I would expect to see continued effort and continued developments on that front in the coming years.”

Christopher Woody is a defense journalist based in Bangkok. You can follow him on Twitter and read more of his work here.