A general view taken on March 7, 2025 shows MPs listening to the speech of Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk on the situation in Ukraine at the plenary hall of Poland’s parliament in Warsaw. (WOJTEK RADWANSKI/AFP via Getty Images)
WARSAW and WASHINGTON — Last week, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk stood in front of the parliament and gave a speech on the state of European security. And in it, he made eyebrows all across the world raise up with a declaration that his government was open to joining up with a nuclear security effort proposed by Paris.
“We must also look more boldly into the future when it comes to arms technology. We are seriously talking to the French about their idea of a nuclear umbrella over Europe,” Tusk said. “It is high time for Poland, using not only the resources it has, but also its own experience, experience on the battlefield, Ukrainian experience, to look more boldly at our possibilities concerning the most modern weapons.
“At the moment — I say this with full responsibility — purchases of conventional weapons, the most traditional ones, are not enough.”
It’s an extraordinary statement, but one that experts say should not be a full surprise, given Poland’s longstanding fears about Russia, its aggressiveness in rearming since the Ukraine invasion, and the clear signals from Washington that the NATO alliance may not be as iron clad as believed for decades.
Artur Kacprzyk of the Polish Institute of International Affairs says the timing of Tusk’s comment reflects real world politics.
“It is possible that a national nuclear option is being floated by the Polish government to convince the U.S. not to weaken security guarantees for Poland at the time when the Trump administration seeks a reset with Russia and indicated it would cut military presence in Europe,” Kacprzyk told Breaking Defense.
“Poland’s history makes it very clear why they are concerned that the people they align with, and the people they rely on for protection from Russia, will abandon them,” Jon Wolfsthal, a former US government official now with the Federation of American Scientists, told Breaking Defense. Tusk’s comments are likely “a signal of concern — maybe to motivate the United States, but clearly designed to play on the French and perhaps the British. But I think it’s also an open, transparent signal for concern in trying to figure out how they protect themselves.”
Added Marek Świerczyński, head of the security and international affairs desk at the Polityka Insight center for policy analysis based in Warsaw, “Tusk’s declaration that ‘Poland must reach for the most modern possibilities also related to nuclear weapons and modern unconventional weapons’ … must be recognized that it is the most far-reaching [nuclear statement] because it comes from the prime minister, in parliament and at a time of rebuilding the European security order.”
It doesn’t appear the issue is going away anytime soon. On Thursday, Polish President Andrzej Duda, a political opponent of Tusk, called for the US to base nuclear weapons on Polish soil. But analysts tell Breaking Defense that the issue comes with major logistical, and geopolitical, hurdles.
A Nuclear History
In the early 1960s, the Polish Army was equipped with two Soviet nuclear-capable weapons, the 8K11 and 3R10 missiles. Due to their low accuracy, they could only be effectively used as carriers of 3N14 nuclear warheads. Twelve of the MiG-21PFM aircraft delivered to Poland were also adapted to carry nuclear weapons.
In the mid-1960s, Polish-Soviet talks resulted in an agreement to build three nuclear weapons depots inside Poland, based on Soviet plans, each equipped with two nuclear weapons stores. According to initial plans, they were to store 178 nuclear warheads, which were to be carried by 8K11 and 3R10 missiles. Construction of the depots began in 1967 and was completed in January 1970. Then the depots were transferred to the Northern Group of Soviet Forces, which was to take care of the charges until the outbreak of war with NATO, in which case control was to be transferred to the Polish Army.
According to disclosed data, in the mid-1980s they stored 14 500-kT warheads, 83 10-kT warheads, two 200-kT bombs, 24 15-kT bombs and 10 0.5-kT bombs. In 1991, Poland announced that they would remove the nuclear capable delivery systems from their weapons inventory.
Still, questions inside Poland about whether it benefits them to have nuclear weapons in country has persisted. They only gained energy after the Ukraine invasion, when Poland launched a dramatic reinvention of its armed forces. Tusk’s statement isn’t even the first time a recent prime minister raised the issue: In June 2023, then-Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared his interest in hosting nuclear weapons under the NATO umbrella.
But the push has new energy given the events of the last few weeks: the dramatic White House meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the statements from European leaders that they can no longer rely on America as a partner, and Trump’s further statements that he may not feel obligated to protect NATO nations in case of a conflict.
According to a Feb. 21 poll, 52.9 percent of surveyed Poles supported the idea of Poland having its own nuclear weapons, with 27.9 percent against. Support for the nuclear option is likely to increase if Poland’s security environment deteriorates further, especially if Russia scores a victory in its war against Ukraine, and the US reduces its military presence in Europe and commitment to NATO.
Donald Tusk, the leader of Civic Platform (PO) opposition alliance, speaks during election convention in Katowice, Poland on October 12, 2023. This year’s parliamentary elections will be held in Poland on October 15th. (Photo by Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
What Could A Nuclear Poland Look Like?
Analysts who spoke to Breaking Defense emphasized that Tusk’s statement was fairly broad, and details are fairly scant.
Świerczyński noted that “we must first know what we are talking about, and unfortunately both President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal and Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s statement do not make this task any easier.”
At a base level, though, Świerczyński feels Tusk made a mistake even talking publicly about the concept.
“It is not like partners, competitors or — most of all — enemies would look on idly at some hypothetical-theoretical ‘Polish nuclear program,’” he said. “In this sense, I am angry with the Prime Minister for talking about it at all, because these matters are so sensitive that it is better to talk about them as little as possible and do as much as possible — quietly, without bragging or even showing the effects, although this is difficult for a politician.”
What a French nuclear umbrella for Poland would look like is unclear.
A former defense official, speaking on background, told Breaking Defense that “In Europe, the United Kingdom and France, which possess relatively small nuclear arsenals, would be hard-pressed to replace the backstop provided by U.S. conventional and nuclear forces on behalf of the continent absent a different approach to requirements or costly changes in force diversity and size.”
In theory, Wolfsthal said, “France has nuclear subs, so potentially those could be at the disposal of Europe, and if you put French troops on the border with Russia that means France is committed to protect those troops, and that’s a tripwire.” But, he emphasized, such a shift would require a radical posture change for France.
As first reported by Breaking Defense, the F-35 was certified to carry and deploy the B61-12 tactical nuclear weapon in October 2023; Poland is currently in the process of procuring 32 of the stealth fighters, which will all be delivered by 2029. However, the F-35 isn’t qualified to carry any French nuclear weapons, so teaming up with Paris would likely require alternatives — whether bringing old Mirage 2000s back into service or having some of France’s limited nuclear-capable Rafales stationed inside the country.
While Tusk did not rule out a domestic nuclear effort, Poland developing its own nuclear program is almost surely unrealistic, according to Kacprzyk, both for logistical and geopolitical reasons.
“While Poland could perhaps produce first explosive nuclear devices within a few years of a determined effort, it would take much longer to obtain a credible nuclear arsenal,” he said. “Risks would be related to the detection of such a nuclear program by Russia and allies alike.”
“While pursuing nuclear weapons, Poland would have to contend with the risk of Russia using force to prevent such a program from being successful,” Kacprzyk added. However, he noted that if Poland sees risk at being abandoned by the US, Warsaw would “be at high risk of Russian aggression anyway.”
Added Wolfsthal, “If NATO’s in shambles and Poland says we need a nuke, wherever they build it, those become instant targets. It becomes very unstable and very volatile very quickly.”
And how Poland’s allies might react is also unclear. In theory, Warsaw could face sanctions or isolation for violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but realistically, Poland would be taking action in conjunction with other European nations.
By acting jointly in the future, European countries could pool their knowledge, resources, and infrastructure and make it more difficult for Russia to try to forcibly prevent nuclear weapons programs” Kacprzyk observed.
But the political fallout would be wide, said the former Pentagon official, because “a decision by even one of our democratic allies or partners to actually cross the nuclear weapons threshold is not something the NPT is likely to be able to survive.”
