The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Asheville (SSN 758), departs Polaris Point, Naval Base Guam. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Justin Wolpert)
The United States is a Pacific power, yet we are mostly resident in the Eastern Pacific and lack significant presence in the Western Pacific. This geographic conundrum carries heavy implications for everything from supply chains to trade, but from a national security perspective our competitors and adversaries — that axis of China, Russia and North Korea — all are advantaged by their physical proximity to the areas we seek to safeguard.
In the event of a contingency, whether in the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, or the South and East China Seas, the United States will be playing on the road as the “away team.” The important exception to this geographic imbalance is found in the great Pacific territories of the United States — and in particular, the US territory of Guam. This is why the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) identified the defense of Guam as number one on his “unfunded priorities list” in 2024.
As the Jan. 20, 2025 inauguration approaches, the incoming administration will confront a risk of conflict in the Indo-Pacific that is likely at a post-Vietnam War high. For the new administration, Guam and its defense should be among our highest national security priorities.
To put a finer point on it, absent more urgent moves to bolster Guam’s defense, the risk of military conflict will grow even greater, and our ability to protect our interests will be significantly diminished.
The security picture compels us to place a premium on “forward deployed” military forces in the region, and it further compels us to find the means to sustain them in a contested environment. And while we are highly reliant on allied nations for basing and access for US forces, it is becoming increasingly clear that most valuable piece of land in the event of a fight in the Pacific could in fact be Guam.
While there are a number of reasons Guam is so valuable and its defense so important, the two qualities that are fundamental to Guam being almost irreplaceable from a military perspective are its location, and its political status.
Guam enjoys a “Goldilocks” placement in the Pacific — not too far, and not too close. The island is far enough from the potential fight to have some natural protections against many classes of weapon systems potentially employed by our adversaries. And yet Guam is closer to Beijing than it is to Hawaii — close enough to the fight to be a place for combat force generation. The same proximity also allows Guam to serve as a place for maintenance, repair and sustainment.
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Guam’s status as an unincorporated territory of the United States is also key to its importance. Being sovereign territory allows for a large footprint and robust posture on the island — almost 15 percent of the island’s population are US service members and their dependents. It also removes the uncertainty associated with potential political constraints a host nation might impose on our military during a time of crisis.
With almost 10,000 military personnel on the island, DoD has chosen to base (either permanently or on a rotating basis) on Guam its most lethal and exquisite systems such as F-35 fighters, B-2 Bombers, and Virginia-class fast attack submarines. Guam is also the location for strategic fuel reserves, munitions storage, and advanced maintenance capabilities for all of these.
In brief, Guam being a safe harbor means America has a much freer hand across the full spectrum of military action. It is arguable that the most significant variable determining success or failure during a Pacific contingency is how well America has chosen to defend Guam.
Don’t take my word for it: take our adversaries.
In 2017, during the “fire and fury” period, North Korea threatened to strike US military targets on Guam. In 2018, the PLA confirmed that the DF-26 missile was operational and fielded with a range capable of hitting Guam (the missile has been dubbed in Chinese media as “Guam killer”). Other potential threats exist as well, such as from PLA submarines and potential CCP cyber attacks on island infrastructure.
Which is why its puzzling that investment in the island has lagged behind the stated needs.
Of course, DoD must weigh competing priorities across its investments. But there are some aspects of Guam’s defense that require urgent action.
Priority one: protection against increasingly lethal and accurate missiles. INDOPACOM recently issued a requirement for “360-degree coverage, and layered defense against regional ballistic, maneuvering ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missile threats.” The DoD and Congress should move out quickly to make this a reality.
Guam needs passive missile defense as well. Such requirements include hardened aircraft shelters, rapid runway and port repair capabilities, mobile communication capabilities, and mobile fuel storage.
Beyond both active and passive missile defenses, Guam has tremendous infrastructure needs. With the surge of force presence and military hardware, there is a pressing need for military housing, medical care facilities, and more expansive maintenance and repair capacity across the services.
As Guam’s importance grows, our adversaries will seek all means available to hold it at risk. The US citizens of Guam deserve our protection and the US military and our allies depend on it. Deterrence will be strengthened and the possibility of war will be lessened if we act quickly and truly help with the defense of Guam where it is needed most urgently.
The DoD and Congress should move out quickly to support Guam’s needs, enabling it to be that most valuable geography for INDOPACOM forces in the vast region of the Western Pacific.
Randall Schriver is the Chairman of the Board of the Project 2049 Institute. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Indo-Pacific matters.
