WASHINGTON — In the face of growing threats from Russia, China and North Korea, the Defense Department is considering options to increase the number of nuclear weapons launchers and warheads at its disposal as part of a year-long strategic review, according to a senior Pentagon policy official.
“We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea and air legs that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” Vipin Narang, acting assistant secretary for space policy, told the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Project on Nuclear Security Issues today.
Narang, who also is responsible for nuclear, missile defense and cyber policy, explained that his office for the past year has been undertaking a “strategy-driven review of the implications of the new security environment for strategic deterrence and US nuclear posture.” The process, he noted, is “overseen at very senior levels of the government and includes interagency stakeholders.”
His comments expanded on remarks made June 7 by Pranay Vaddi, the National Security Council’s senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, at the Arms Control Association annual meeting — with Narang echoing Vaddi’s statement that while still pursuing diplomatic avenues, the Biden administration is now pursuing “a more competitive approach.”
Narang explained that the threat environment has significantly expanded since the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. In particular, he said: Russia not only has been saber rattling in Ukraine, but also “is developing” a satellite to carry a nuclear weapon; China, using Russian-supplied fuel, has “accelerated” its nuclear building up and “likely” will have “1,000 operational warheads” with silo loading already commencing; and, North Korea “continues to expand, diversify and approve its nuclear, ballistic missile and non nuclear capabilities.”
Thus, the DoD review “began with the principal question, what capabilities and posture do we need to credibly deter attack on the US homeland as well as our allies and vital regional interests, not just today, but tomorrow. If adjustments to our hardware and software are necessary, how do we prioritize them? How do we avoid additional risk to our existing plans and the nuclear production complex?
“As part of this we’re taking a fresh look at the US nuclear modernization, including examining the underlying assumptions of the modernization program, which was conceived at a time when we assumed we would only have to deter a New START-compliant Russia,” he added.
New START, inked in 2010, is the only remaining US-Russian treaty capping both sides’ nuclear arsenals, and will expire in February 2026. The treaty limits Russia and the US each to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (meaning ICBMs, submarines and bombers). Moscow has refused to enter into negotiations with Washington to renew the treaty, after suspending its compliance in February 2023, citing US and Western support of Ukraine in the ongoing war. The US has continued to abide by the limits.
Narang explained that while current nuclear modernization plans — estimated by the Government Accountability Office last October to cost at least $350 billion over the next two decades — are “necessary,” they “may well be insufficient” to meet current and future threats.
He stressed, however, that at the moment DoD is confident in its ability to deter nuclear threats.
“Let there be no doubt we are confident in our current forces and posture today, we will also abide by the central limits of new start for the duration of the treaty, as long as we assess that Russia continues to do so. But in an uncertain world, preserving the option to change course tomorrow requires that we make necessary decisions and investments today,” he said.