NC3 space systems face critical modernization challenges, new study finds

WASHINGTON — While the Defense Department is investing billions in modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, it is in danger of losing sight of serious risks to the foundational space-based systems of nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) that underpin those air-, land- and sea-based weapons, a study published today by the Atlantic Council argues.

Critically, NC3’s space-based elements “face different geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges” than the other elements of the broad, multi-year nuclear modernization effort — for which the Pentagon asked nearly $50 billion in its fiscal 2025 budget request, the study, “Modernizing
Space-Based Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications,” finds.

“Geopolitically, the two-nuclear-peer challenge, China’s perception of NC3 and strategic stability, and the prospect of limited nuclear use call into question the sufficiency of existing and next-generation NC3. Technically, Russia and China are developing more sophisticated counterspace weapons, which hold at risk space-based US NC3. Bureaucratically, the US Department of Defense (DOD)’s shift to a  proliferated space architecture may not be appropriately prioritizing requirements for systems that are essential for NC3 missions,” the study sums up.

The authors are both veteran space policy gurus: Pete Hays, a retired Air Force colonel who consults for the Space Force staff after spending 20 years at DoD working on space policy issues; and Sarah Mineiro, a senior associate (non-resident) for the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who, as a former Republican staffer for the House Armed Services strategic forces committee, had a key hand in writing the legislation creating both US Space Command and the Space Force.

The study notes that NC3 is one of the least understood of the many parts that make up the US nuclear weapons architecture, in part because of the high levels of secrecy that surround it. Thus, it is difficult for policymakers and service leaders to focus needed attention on it.

“In simple terms, NC3 is the protected and assured missile, air, and space warning and communication system enabling the command and control of US nuclear forces that must operate effectively under the most extreme and existentially challenging conditions—employment of nuclear weapons,” the paper explains.

NC3 has five essential functions: “detection, warning, and attack characterization; adaptive nuclear planning; decision-making conferencing; receiving and executing Presidential orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces,” it adds.

As such, the system “must never permit the use of nuclear weapons unless specifically authorized by the president,” the paper stresses, and the tolerance for risk “is understandably nonexistent.”

However, the authors write, risks and challenges now abound, especially as NC3 modernization efforts commence.

China’s own nuclear buildup and its lack of understanding about the strategic instability of targeting US NC3 satellites are one key problem that has yet to be addressed, the study says. This is exacerbated by China’s unwillingness to engage on nuclear arms control issues.

But others risks are of the Pentagon’s own making, the report cautions.

First, while it is clear that plans to digitize many of the original analog NC3 systems will improve decision-making speed and contribute to DoD’s strategy for Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), that digitization also comes with considerable issues with ensuring cybersecurity and supply chain protections.

Second, the study says, “almost all the DOD’s bureaucratic structures that acquired the current NC3 systems have changed, sometimes in radical ways. Primary responsibility for acquisition of important elements of the NC3 system are now divided between several organizations that are not focused on nuclear surety, making it a significant challenge to achieve effective integration and unity of command and effort across this structure.” That problem, the authors assert, is being exacerbated by the Space Force’s push for a hybrid space architecture “that uses commercial, international, and government systems and capabilities to enhance space.”

The study makes three overarching recommendations, each with specific sub-items:

DoD should “continue to support space-based NC3 modernization,” but with attention to “tailoring” updates to mitigate system-specific geopolitical and technical risks. This includes, for example, hardening new satellites in lower Earth orbit against radiation effects and launching in-depth studies of the “nuclear surety implications” of moves to “disaggregate” nuclear from conventional satellite communications constellations,
The Pentagon needs a holistic approach to assuring both the commercial viability and military utility of any space-based services it might rely upon for parts of the NC3 space construct.
DoD “should recognize the significant challenges and potential incompatibilities it faces in rapidly and simultaneously developing modernized space-based NC3 and fielding an overall hybrid space architecture that is far more resilient.”